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TRESPASS, NUISANCE, AND THE COSTS OF
DETERMINING PROPERTY RIGHTS
THOMAS W. MERRILL*
THE right to exclude intrusions by others, we have it on high authority,
is "one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are com-
monly characterized as property."' Yet the right to exclude is not one
right; it is itself a collection or "bundle" of rights. With respect to prop-
erty in land, for example, the right to exclude depends to a large extent on
whether the intrusion in question is subject to the common law of trespass
or of nuisance.2 Generally speaking, when the intrusion is governed by
trespass, then there is no exception for de minimis harms, a rule of strict
liability applies, and the landholder can obtain an injunction to prevent
future invasions. When the intrusion is governed by nuisance, however,
then there will be no liability absent a showing of substantial harm, as a
rule the landholder must show that the costs of the intrusion outweigh its
benefits, and even then the party subject to the interference may be
awarded only damages rather than an injunction for future harms. Thus,
the right of a landholder to exclude means one thing with respect to
certain intrusions-those subject to the law of trespass-but something
altogether different with respect to others-those subject to the law of
nuisance.
* Northwestern University School of Law. I would like to thank Anthony D'Amato,
Frank Easterbrook, Victor Goldberg, Carol Rose, Marshall Shapo, and the participants in a
Northwestern University School of Law Faculty Workshop for their helpful comments on
earlier drafts.
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979); see also Pruneyard Shopping
Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82 (1979).
2 These are not the only legal doctrines that define a landholder's right to exclude. For
example, the action for ejectment serves as an important supplement to the action for
trespass-allowing one who holds title to land to sue for possession even after he has been
dispossessed by the defendant. In addition, there are numerous constitutional, statutory,
and common-law doctrines that supplement and qualify these actions-some of which will
be considered in Section IV infra.
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How do we account for the use of these different legal standards in
defining a landholder's right to exclude intrusions by others? And how do
we explain the legal system's differentiation between those intrusions
subject to the rule of trespass and those subject to nuisance? In this
article, I will apply a simple economic model in an effort to answer these
questions. The central thesis is that when the costs of transacting are low,
the legal system will gravitate toward rules that determine entitlements at
a low cost-such as the strict liability rule of trespass. The combination of
low transaction costs and low entitlement-determination costs will max-
imize the extent to which conflicts between competing uses of land can be
resolved by market transactions. In contrast, when the costs of transact-
ing are apt to be high, the legal system will incline toward rules for the
determination of entitlements that are more expensive-such as the
balancing or cost-benefit approach of nuisance. When market mecha-
nisms fail, these more expensive entitlement-determination rules are nec-
essary in order to give judges the needed discretion to adopt what they
perceive as the best "compromise" solution (the efficient solution) to
land use disputes.
Although I will use this economic model primarily to explain the differ-
ences between trespass and nuisance and the sorts of intrusions covered
by each action, the model has the potential for broader application. In
Section IV, I will survey some other issues involving the rights to ex-
clude, use, and transfer property and will suggest that the relationship
between transaction costs and entitlement-determination costs can ac-
count for some of the legal doctrine in these areas. Finally, although the
main thrust of the article is positive in its orientation, in Section V I will
raise some normative issues for those who believe that the legal system
should be concerned, at least in part, with the maximization of social
utility or wealth. Here, I argue that low-cost mechanical entitlement-
determination rules play an important role in facilitating the exchange and
modification of property rights-a role often overlooked by commen-
tators who view them simply as decisional rules to be applied in litigation.
I. TRESPASS AND NUISANCE
Although trespass and nuisance are both concerned with the right to
exclude intrusions by others, they govern different sorts of physical phe-
nomena. Trespass applies to relatively gross invasions by tangible ob-
jects-persons, cars, buildings and the like.3 Nuisance applies to more
indirect and intangible interferences-noise, odor, smoke, funeral homes,
3 See Section III infra.
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and so forth.4 For the moment, we need not consider the exact line of
demarcation between the underlying phenomena or the rationale for that
line. I will return to this issue and discuss it at length in Section III. It is
first necessary to understand the legal consequences of classifying a given
interference as being subject to the rule of either trespass or nuisance.
For this purpose, it is useful to refer to some simple examples drawn
from recent cases. Suppose A and B are adjacent landholders. In case 1,5
B has a long driveway which runs along his common border with A. At
the end of this driveway, B has a loading dock. In order for B's trucks to
turn around and unload at the loading dock, B's agents must drive onto
and back off from A's property. An intrusion of this sort-the repeated
driving of trucks on and off a neighbor's property-is the sort of gross,
tangible invasion that is governed by the law of trespass. In case 2,6 B has
a factory which makes a great deal of noise when in operation; A has a
family residence. For many years, B operates only one eight-hour shift,
which does not unduly disturb A. Subsequently, in an effort to increase
production, B starts operating three shifts around the clock. As a conse-
quence, A can no longer sleep at night. This kind of intrusion-the re-
peated invasion of a neighbor's peace and quiet by sound waves-is
governed by the law of nuisance.7
In terms of both substantive and remedial doctrine, there are major
differences in the law that will be applied in case 1 and case 2. Substan-
tively, the principal distinction 8 is the standard of care that courts apply in
determining whether the interference is actionable; that is, whether A's
property interest includes the right to exclude B's offending intrusion or
B's property interest includes the right to engage in the offending intru-
sion free of any exclusion from A. These disparities are most pronounced
4 See Section Ill infra.
5 Warsaw v. Chicago Metallic Ceilings, Inc., 35 Cal. 3d 564, 199 Cal. Rptr. 773, 676 P.2d
584 (1984). No question was presented as to whether the intrusions were a trespass, but only
whether the intruder had, because of the passage of the statute of limitations, acquired a
prescriptive easement.
6 Wilson v. Interlake Steel Co., 32 Cal. 3d 229, 185 Cal. Rptr. 280, 649 P.2d 922 (1982).
7 Id.
8 Two other differences should be briefly noted. First, there is a traditional distinction in
terms of who has "standing" to bring an action to exclude an interference with land.
Trespass can be brought only by a possessor of land. Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 157,
158 (1965). Nuisance, on the other hand, can be brought either by a possessor or by one who
has a nonpossessory ownership interest (a reversion or remainder, for example) that is
"detrimentally affected" by an interference with land. Id. § 821E (1979). Second, the statute
of limitations for trespass is typically longer than the statute of limitations for nuisance. See,
for example, Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 221 Or. 86, 342 P.2d 790 (1959), cert. denied,
362 U.S. 918 (1960); Fairview Farms, Inc. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 176 F. Supp. 178 (D. Or.
1959).
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with respect to intentional intrusions-a category which includes not only
actions in which B specifically intends to interfere with A's interest in
land, but also actions undertaken by B which B knows will interfere with
A's interest. 9 Thus, if B directs his agents to back up their trucks to the
loading dock, knowing that they must drive on A's property to do so, B
will be chargeable with an intentional intrusion, even though he harbors
no specific intent to injure A. Similarly, if B knows that his factory makes
enough noise to disturb sleeping neighbors, his decision to operate the
factory at night constitutes an intentional interference, even though he
has no specific intent to disturb anyone's sleep.'°
Intentional intrusions subject to the rule of trespass are governed by a
standard of care which is "exceptionally simple and exceptionally rigor-
ous."" In order to establish an actionable trespass, all that A need show
is that B is responsible for an invasion of the column of space that defines
A's possessory interest under the ad coelum rule.' 2 No weighing or
balancing of costs and benefits is involved. Thus, one who commits an act
which qualifies as an intentional trespass is subject to liability whether or
not the benefits of the interfering act-either to B or to the community at
large-are greater than the harm imposed on A. 13 Indeed, according to
the Restatement of Torts, B will be subject to liability "irrespective of
whether he thereby causes harm to any legally protected interest of the
other." 14 Therefore, in case 1 the action of B's agents in driving on and off
A's driveway will be considered an actionable trespass, even if these
invasions are shown to be only "trifling inconveniences" that do not
interfere with A's use and enjoyment of his property.1
5
9 See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 158, comment 1 (1965) (intentional trespass); id.,
§ 825 (1979) (intentional nuisance).
10 See id. § 825, comment d, illustrations 2 and 4. This is not to say that there is no judicial
confusion about what constitutes an "intentional" intrusion. See Copart Industries v. Con-
solidated Edison Co., 41 N.Y.2d 564, 362 N.E.2d 968, 394 N.Y.S.2d 169 (1977), upholding a
jury instruction referring to "negligence"-which would be appropriate only if the interfer-
ence were unintentional-in the context of what was clearly an intentional nuisance, as
defined by the Restatement.
" William L. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts 63 (4th ed. 1971), quoting I Thomas
A. Street, Foundations of Legal Liability 19 (1906).
12 The complete maxim is "'cuius est solum eius usque ad coelum et usque ad inferos" (he
who owns the soil owns up to the heavens and down to the depths). See generally Charles
Donahue, Jr., Thomas E. Kauper, & Peter W. Martin, Cases and Materials on Property: An
Introduction to the Concept and the Institution, ch. 3 (2d ed. 1983).
13 According to the Restatement, liability is imposed for trespass if one intentionally "(a)
enters land in the possession of the other, or causes a thing or a third person to do so, or (b)
remains on the land, or (c) fails to remove from the land a thing which he is under a duty to
remove." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 158 (1965).
14 Id.
I5 Prosser, supra note II, at 66.
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Intentional harms subject to the law of nuisance, in contrast, are gov-
erned by a standard of care that is neither so simple nor so rigorous.
Indeed, some commentators have despairingly described the legal doc-
trine surrounding the concept of nuisance as an "impenetrable jungle."'
6
Nevertheless, the description of the standard of care set forth in the
Restatement of Torts, which is widely followed by American courts,'
7
provides at least an appropriate reference point for comparison to the law
of trespass. According to the Restatement, "[t]here is liability for a nui-
sance only to those to whom it causes significant harm, of a kind that
would be suffered by a normal person in the community or by property in
normal condition and used for a normal purpose." 18 Clearly, then, a mere
"trifling inconvenience" is not actionable.' 9 In addition, an intentional
nuisance will result in liability only if it is "unreasonable." The primary
definition of "unreasonable," again according to the Restatement, is that
"the gravity of the harm outweighs the utility of the actor's conduct."
20
Following the Restatement in case 2, therefore, A will have to show not
only that the loss of sleep would represent a "significant harm" to a
16 Id. at 571.
17 See, for example, Birchwood Lakes Colony Club v. Medford Lakes, 179 N.J. Super.
409, 432 A.2d 525, 538 (1981), judgment modified, 90 N.J. 582, 449 A.2d 472 (1982).
IS Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821F (1979).
19 See Joel Franklin Brenner, Nuisance Law and the Industrial Revolution, 3 J. Legal
Stud. 403, 415-20 (1974).
20 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 826 (1979). The balancing approach of the Restate-
ment can be traced to the notion that only "unreasonable" interferences are actionable, and
that in determining what is unreasonable "the time, locality, and all the circumstances
should be taken into account." St. Helens Smelting Co. v. Tipping (1863) 4 B. & S. 608, 616,
11 H. L. C. 642, 11 Eng. Rep. 1483. Richard Epstein argues that, properly understood,
* 'reasonable" in this context simply means "insubstantial." Richard A. Epstein, Nuisance
Law: Corrective Justice and Its Utilitarian Constraints, 8 J. Legal Stud. 49, 85 (1979).
However this may be as a matter of original exegesis, many American courts have inter-
preted the reasonableness requirement as authorizing a kind of general utilitarian calculus in
resolving nuisance disputes. See, for example, Riblet v. Spokane-Portland Cement Co., 41
Wash. 2d 249, 248 P.2d 380 (1952); De Blois v. Bowers, 44 F.2d 621 (D. Mass. 1930). The
rule is, however, not uniform. See Jost v. Dairyland Power Cooperative, 45 Wis. 2d 164, 172
N.W.2d 647 (1969). In 1979, the draftsmen of the Restatement added a second definition of
"unreasonable," providing that an intentional interference would be unreasonable if "the
harm caused by the conduct is serious and the financial burden of compensating for this and
similar harm to others would not make the continuation of the conduct not feasible."
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 826 (b) (1979). The purpose of the new provision, appar-
ently, was to facilitate damage awards in cases such as Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26
N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970), where the court finds a nuisance, but
declines to order injunctive relief. See Edward Rabin, Nuisance Law: Rethinking Funda-
mental Assumptions, 63 Va. L. Rev. 1299, 1317-18 (1977). Interestingly, even this limited
form of strict liability in damages has encountered judicial resistance. See Copart Industries
v. Consolidated Edison Co., 41 N.Y.2d 564, 362 N.E.2d 968, 394 N.Y.S.2d 169 (1977),
where the New York Court of Appeals declined to apply a tentative draft of § 826 (b),
upholding instead a jury verdict that there was no nuisance.
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person of normal sensitivities, but also that the harm to A and similarly
situated neighbors is greater than the benefits that accrue to B and society
generally from increased production and employment at the factory. 2'
In addition, trespass and nuisance differ in terms of the remedies avail-
able once an actionable interference is established. Here, perhaps the
most important distinction involves the standards for issuance of an in-
junction. With respect to intentional trespasses, courts will generally is-
sue an injunction against recurring invasions without engaging in any
"balancing of equities"--a weighing of the relative strength of A's inter-
est, B's interest, and other possible societal interests-before granting
the requested relief.22 With respect to intentional nuisances, however,
almost all courts will engage in some such balancing exercise before issu-
ing an injunction against future interferences.23 While they may not refer
to the process as "balancing the equities," the weighing process nearly
always takes place just the same.24
Once an injunction is ruled out, either because the intrusion is a non-
recurring one or because of an unfavorable balance of equities, still differ-
ences persist, though perhaps less significant, in the standards governing
the award of damages. Where the intrusion is a trespass, and A cannot
show actual damages, courts generally award the plaintiff at least nominal
damages.2 5 Failure to show actual damages in nuisance, in contrast, usu-
ally results in the denial of all relief (because of the failure to satisfy the
"substantial harm" requirement for liability). Moreover, whether or not
actual damages are incurred, punitive damages are more likely to be
awarded for an intentional trespass than they are for an intentional nui-
sance.
2 6
21 Under a purely economic cost-benefit approach, the relevant question would be what
combination of inputs and activity levels would either maximize the joint profits of the
parties or minimize their joint costs. Thus the court should not only inquire into the damages
suffered by A and similarly situated persons, and the value of increased production to B and
allied interests, but also should ask what abatement techniques are available to B at what
cost, and what avoidance techniques (such as soundproofing) are available to A and simi-
larly situated persons and-at what cost. It can easily be seen that to do such an analysis
correctly, even in a simple case such as Wilson v. Interlake Steel Co., supra note 6, would
be extraordinarily expensive.
22 See Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d 310 (1958).
23 Donahue, Kauper, & Martin, supra note 12, at 1046; Annot., 40 A.L.R.3d 601, 612
(1971).
24 See Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870,309 N.Y.S.2d 312
(1970).
25 Prosser, supra note 11, at 66.
26 Many jurisdictions provide by statute for multiple damages for intentional or knowing
trespass. See Annot., II I A.L.R. 79 (1937). For a recent decision discussing the award of
punitive damages for activity that would traditionally be considered a nuisance, see Orchard
View Farms, Inc. v. Martin Marietta Alum., Inc., 500 F. Supp. 984 (D. Or. 1980).
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Given these differences, how should we characterize the distinction
between trespass and nuisance? The distinction does not really corre-
spond to that drawn by Calabresi and Melamed between "property rules"
and "liability rules."-27 To be sure, in its remedial dimension the law of
intentional trespass approximates a property rule-injunctive relief more
or less follows automatically from liability, at least where the intrusion is
a recurring one. But the law of intentional nuisance is neither a property
rule nor a liability rule, but sometimes one and sometimes the other-
depending on how the court comes out in its "balancing of equities."
Moreover, the property rule/liability rule distinction goes only to the
question of remedies to protect substantive rights. As we have just seen,
however, trespass and nuisance differ not only in terms of remedies but
also in terms of the standards applied to establish substantive rights-
whether or not A has the right to exclude intrusions by B in the first place.
A more central theme running through the differences between trespass
and nuisance concerns the degree of discretion given to courts when
resolving questions that involve both substantive and remedial entitle-
ments. Indeed, entitlement-determination rules can be viewed as falling
on a spectrum ranging from "mechanical" rules-those which afford
little discretion to courts in the establishment of entitlements-to "judg-
mental" rules-those which afford very broad discretion to courts in
determining entitlements.28 From this perspective, trespass would have to
be regarded as the quintessential mechanical entitlement-determination
rule. If an interference with an interest in land potentially qualifies as a
trespass, all A must show to obtain an injunction barring B from future
interference is that B is responsible for recurring invasions of the imagi-
nary column of space which defines A's possessory interest. Once the
prescribed invasions are shown, both the substantive right and the rem-
edy follow mechanically-with little room for judicial discretion.
The law of nuisance, in contrast, reflects a judgmental entitlement-
determination rule. If interferences with an interest in land potentially
qualify as a nuisance, then in order to obtain an injunction barring future
invasions, A must (at least if we follow the Restatement account) satisfy a
court (1) that he has sustained substantial harm from the interference; (2)
"7 Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inaliena-
bility: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089, 1092 (1972).
28 The distinction between mechanical rules and judgmental rules is similar to the more
commonly encountered distinction between rules and standards or rules and principles. See
Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking. 3 J. Legal
Stud. 257 (1974); Douglas G. Baird & Robert Weisberg, Rules, Standards, and the Battle of
the Forms: A Reassessment of § 2-207, 68 Va. L. Rev. 1217 (1982). 1 use the judgmental/
mechanical terminology, however, in order to avoid any implication that mechanical rules
necessarily derive from, or are otherwise logically related to, judgmental rules.
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that the harm to A and similarly situated persons outweighs the benefit to
B and society generally if B is allowed to interfere; and (3) that an injunc-
tion against future interference by B is consistent with the balance of
equities. These factors, especially factors (2) and (3), are highly judgmen-
tal; accordingly, they entail the exercise of a considerable degree of dis-
cretion on the part of the court. Moreover, even if the court does not
follow the cost-benefit approach of the Restatement in determining the
question of substantive entitlement, nuisance still falls at the judgmental
end of the spectrum, in part because inquiries (1) and (3)-especially
(3)-still involve a significant degree of discretion. In addition, even aside
from the cost-benefit calculus espoused by the Restatement, the substan-
tive law of nuisance contains a bewildering array of Latin maxims,29
conflicting formulations of the standard of care, 30 and defenses and quasi
defenses. 3' All of these, taken together, confer a very broad discretion on
courts as to how they come out in particular controversies.
If the mechanical/judgmental distinction accurately captures the core
contrast between trespass and nuisance, then the question becomes, Why
would a common-law system develop two sets of rules-one mechanical
and the other judgmental-for determining the right of a landholder to
exclude interference by others? In the next section, I will consider
whether economic analysis can supply a hypothesis that would account
for this phenomenon.
II. TRANSACTION COSTS AND ENTITLEMENT-DETERMINATION COSTS
The economic significance of the contrast between mechanical and
judgmental entitlement-determination rules can be developed in terms of
the familiar Coase theorem.3 2 That theorem posits that under certain
29 For example, "sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedes" (every person is bound to use his
property so as not to injure that of another), see Fontainebleau Hotel v. Forty-Five Twenty-
Five, Inc., 114 So. 2d 357, 359 (Fla. 1959); and the distinction between nuisance per se and
nuisance per accidens, see Morgan v. High Penn Oil Co., 238 N.C. 185, 190, 77 S.E.2d 682,
687 (1953).
3 Compare Copart Industries v. Consolidated Edison Co., 41 N.Y.2d 564, 362 N.E.2d 968,
394 N.Y.S.2d 169 (1977) (upholding jury instruction based on negligence) with Reynolds
Metals Co. v. Yturbide, 258 F.2d 321 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 840 (1958) (applying
res ipsa loquitur), with Jost v. Dairyland Power Cooperative, 45 Wis. 2d 164, 172 N.W.2d
647 (1969) (applying strict liability).
3 For example, whether or not the plaintiff came to the nuisance, see Spur Industries v.
Del E. Webb Development Co., 108 Ariz. 178. 184-85, 494 P.2d 700, 706-07 (1972); Annot.,
42 A.L.R.3d 344 (1972); and whether or not the plaintiff is more than ordinarily sensitive to
the intrusion in question, see Amphitheaters, Inc. v. Portland Meadows, 184 Or. 336, 349-
52, 198 P.2d 847, 852-53 (1948).
32 R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. Law & Econ. I (1960).
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rigorous assumptions-which include zero transaction costs, clearly de-
lineated property rights, perfect information about production and con-
sumption functions, no wealth effects, and maximizing behavior by all
parties 33-the assignment of property rights will not affect decisions
about the use and consumption of resources. Regardless of who is initially
assigned the property right, the parties will exchange or modify those
rights until they achieve the allocation of resources which maximizes their
joint welfare. This conclusion can be generalized to any operation of
explicit markets. If the assumptions underlying the Coase theorem are all
satisfied, voluntary rearrangements of property rights will maximize the
aggregate welfare of all market participants.34
In the real world, of course, the assumptions underlying the Coase
theorem are never realized. Nevertheless, in order to explore the
significance of entitlement-determination rules, I will assume that all con-
ditions necessary for an "ideal" allocation of resources are satisfied save
two: the assumption of zero transaction costs, and the assumption of
clearly delineated property rights-which I will refer to as the assumption
of zero entitlement-determination costs. (If it is costless to determine
legal entitlements, then the delineation of property rights should always
be clear.) 35 Given the potential ambiguity of these concepts, 36 a brief word
is in order about how they will be used here.
Transaction costs, as I will use the term, consist of the resources that
must be expended in order to enter into and enforce contracts for the
exchange or modification of property rights. As Coase put it, they are the
resources that must be expended "to discover who it is that one wishes to
deal with . . . and on what terms, to conduct negotiations leading up to a
bargain, to draw up the contract, to undertake the inspection needed to
make sure that the terms of the contract are being observed, and so on.' 
37
13 For a succinct discussion of the various assumptions underlying the Coase theorem,
see Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew Spitzer, The Coase Theorem: Some Experimental Tests,
25 J. Law & Econ. 73, 73-77 (1982). See also Robert Cooter, The Cost of Coase, I I J. Legal
Stud. 1 (1982).
4 See Guido Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation and Liability Rules-a
Comment, II J. Law & Econ. 67, 68 (1968).
" Thus Hoffman & Spitzer, supra note 33, at 73, refer to the assumption of clearly
delineated property rights as one of a "costless court system."
36 For example, it has been noted that the concept of transaction costs is poorly defined in
the literature and can be used either narrowly to refer to the costs of negotiating, drafting,
and enforcing contracts, or broadly to refer to virtually any factor which causes a market
economy to diverge from perfect efficiency. See Victor P. Goldberg, Production Functions,
Transaction Costs and the New Institutionalism, in Issues in Contemporary Microeconom-
ics (George Feiwel ed. 1984); Carl Dahlman, The Problem of Externality, 22 J. Law & Econ.
141 (1979). 1 use the term in the narrow sense.
17 Coase, supra note 32, at 15. In this sense, transaction costs are distinguishable from
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For present purposes, the magnitude of transaction costs can be seen as
primarily a function of several variables largely independent of the nature
of the legal regime:38 the difficulty of identifying the parties who may wish
to exchange or modify property rights; the number of parties who will
have to enter into the contract in order to make it effective; whether the
relationship between the parties is "discrete" (one shot) or "relational"
(long term); and whether one of the parties who wishes to sell or acquire
property rights is in the position of a monopolist vis-A-vis the others.3 9
The more difficult it is to identify the parties to the exchange, the higher
the search costs that must be incurred before entering into a contract. The
larger the number of parties, the more complicated the contract must be,
and the more likely it becomes that free-rider or holdout problems will
develop. 40 The more relational the situation between the parties, the more
likely it becomes that the parties must provide for long-term monitoring,
enforcement, or adjustment mechanisms, and the more likely it becomes
that one or more parties will bargain strategically in order to influence the
future course of dealings. Finally, if one of the parties is in the position of
a monopolist vis-a-vis the others, the more likely it becomes that this
party will hold out or otherwise bargain strategically in order to obtain a
disproportionate share of the gains from trade. 4'
other costs that may interfere with the exchange or modification of property rights, such as
the costs of gathering information about production or consumption functions and the costs
of determining entitlements.
38 This is not to say that legal rules such as the law of contracts will not affect transaction
costs. For example, I surmise that mechanical rules of contract law-such as the mirror
image rule of offer and acceptance, the doctrine of consideration, the Statute of Frauds, and
the parol evidence rule-will tend to lower transaction costs, whereas judgmental rules of
contract law-such as implied warranties of merchantability, the doctrine of unconsciona-
bility and the like-will tend to raise transaction costs. See Baird & Weisberg, supra note
28, at 1229-31. However, consideration of how the mechanical/judgmental distinction may
bear on transaction costs (as opposed to entitlement-determination costs) is beyond the
scope of the present paper.
39 For a somewhat similar analysis of transaction costs see Thomas Crocker, Exter-
nalities, Property Rights, and Transaction Costs: An Empirical Study, 14 J. Law & Econ.
451, 461-64 (1971) (emphasizing "informational" [identification], "contractual" [negoti-
ating], and "policing" [enforcement] costs). For a sampling of works that emphasize the
significance of "relational" exchange to the magnitude of transaction costs, see Oliver E.
Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J.
Law & Econ. 233 (1979); Victor P. Goldberg, Regulation and Administered Contracts, 7 Bell
J. Econ. 426 (1976); Ian R. Macneil, The Many Futures of Contracts, 47 S. Cal. L. Rev.
691 (1974).
40 See, for example, A. Mitchell Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The Simple
Economics of Injunctive and Damage Remedies, 32 Stan. L. Rev. 1075, 1107 (1980); Cala-
bresi & Melamed, supra note 27, at 1106-09.
41 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans, and
Other Rescuers: An Economic Study of Law and Altruism, 7 J. Legal Stud. 83, 91 (1978).
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Entitlement-determination costs, in contrast to transaction costs, are
the resources that must be expended in order to establish who has the
property right that is the subject of the exchange. A simple illustration of
entitlement-determination costs is provided by the sale of the proverbial
Blackacre in fee simple. B can purchase Blackacre from A only if A has
something called "title." In order to establish that A has title to the
property, some trained expert-a lawyer or the employee of an abstract
or title insurance company-must examine A's deed (if any) and the chain
of title, and then pass judgment on whether A has marketable title to
Blackacre. If the title examination process reveals a "cloud" on A's title,
A (or B) may have to go to court and litigate the question whether A has
title. The costs incurred in the process of satisfying B (or B's lender) that
A has title to Blackacre are entitlement-determination costs.
For present purposes, the magnitude of entitlement-determination
costs can be seen as primarily a function of whether the rules for deter-
mining property rights are mechanical or judgmental.42 Mechanical
rules-such as the law of intentional trespass-are predictable and rela-
tively inexpensive to apply: generally speaking, they can be applied by
laymen with little or no input from lawers or judges. (This is probably the
principal reason why the tax code, which relies on large-scale compliance
by individuals not trained in the law, consists largely of mechanical
rules. 43) In contrast, judgmental rules-such as the law of intentional
42 Other factors are also clearly relevant, such as whether esoteric factual information
must be developed; whether a government certificate or license must be obtained; and
whether the rules are simple or complex (see note 43 infra). In the title search context, for
instance, the applicable rules-the first-in-time principle as modified by recording statutes
and various rules of construction-are largely mechanical. However, the title search pro-
cess requires the gathering of esoteric information (contained in the public records office or
in a title plant) and the rules involved, although mechanical, are in their totality fairly
complex. Thus, laymen must usually incur the expense of hiring a lawyer or an abstract or
title insurance company to determine the question of title. Nevertheless, it is striking how
rarely the system leads to litigation: virtually all problems that arise can be resolved by
purchasing title insurance or by renegotiating the terms of sale to give account to uninsur-
able risks. Thus, although positive entitlement-determination costs are involved, they are
kept low by the mechanical nature of the rules, and hence they do not appreciably interfere
with a functioning real estate market.
"3 This is not to say that the tax code consists of simple rules. Indeed, it is a familiar
complaint that the tax system has grown too complex to be self-administering, and should be
simplified. The mechanical/judgmental distinction, however, is different from (and indeed
cuts across) the simple/complex distinction. Moreover, I would argue that whether a rule is
mechanical or judgmental is more critical to the magnitude of entitlement-determination
costs than whether it is simple or complex (although obviously simple-mechanical rules
would be the cheapest and complex-judgmental would be the most expensive). For example,
even though the tax system may be too complex for many laymen to understand, it is still
sufficiently mechanical that accountants and bookkeepers can (and do) fill out many tax
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nuisance-are unpredictable and relatively expensive to apply. Judgmen-
tal rules require a large input of legal advice and possibly even a judicial
trial (or legislative or administrative action) before the assignment of
property rights can be established. There is, however, another side to the
distinction between these rules. Mechanical rules, being rigid and inflexi-
ble, may often produce results that, unless subsequently modified by the
affected parties, are perceived as being unjust, unfair, or inefficient. On
the other hand, although judgmental rules are more expensive, they are
also inherently flexible, and thus can be manipulated by courts to achieve
results which are "just," "fair," or "efficient.''"
The reasons why transaction costs must be zero in order to achieve the
Coasian ideal of universal market solutions to resource use disputes
should be fairly obvious. The gains from trade obtainable from any ex-
change or modification of property rights are limited. If the costs of iden-
tifying the affected parties, bargaining to an agreement, drafting a con-
tract, and providing for enforcement of the contract are greater than the
expected gains, then no exchange of property rights will take place.
The reasons why entitlement-determination costs must be zero for the
Coase theorem to hold are analogous, and they are essentially the same as
those given to explain why all litigation is not settled out of court. 5 To be
sure, uncertainty about who holds the property right is not invariably fatal
to an agreement. If the parties share the same estimate of the probability
of who holds the right, and the same preference for risk, then positive
entitlement-determination costs should not matter-in theory, the parties
should negotiate to the same welfare-maximizing allocation of resources
they would have agreed on if property rights were certain, discounting the
price to reflect the shared perception of the probability of who should pay
whom. However, if the parties differ in their estimate of the probability of
who holds the right, or in their preference for risk, then there may be no
range of bid and asked prices within which they can agree on an ex-
change.46 In these circumstances, if there is to be any exchange or
returns and can (and do) provide a great deal of tax advice. This is a far cry from the
situation which would exist under a simple judgmental rule, such as a rule requiring each
taxpayer to pay a "fair" or a "reasonable" portion of his income to the government as a tax.
Such a rule would bring on the lawyers in droves.
" For a similar analysis, advanced in the context of a consideration of per se rules and
rules of reason in antitrust law, see Paul L. Joskow & Alvin K. Klevorick, A Framework for
Analyzing Predatory Pricing Policy, 89 Yale L. J. 213, 240-42 (1979).
45 See Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 434-41 (2d ed. 1977); Patricia
Munch Danzon & Lee A. Lillard, Settlement Out of Court: The Disposition of Medical
Malpractice Claims, 12 J. Legal Stud. 345 (1983) (citing additional sources).
46 In particular, the defendant's estimate of the expected award must be smaller than the
plaintiff's estimate of the expected award. If the defendant's estimate of the expected award
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modification of property rights, the parties must expend resources on
litigation (or other forms of collective resolution, such as political lobby-
ing) to reduce the disparity between their assessments of the assignment
of property rights. The very need to expend these resources, however,
will mean that certain potentially optimizing agreements will never be
reached, because the gains from trade will be less than the costs of litiga-
tion (or other forms of collective resolution). In other words, even in a
situation where transaction costs are low relative to the gains from trade,
high entitlement-determination costs may independently frustrate the
achievement of an ideal allocation of resources.47
Putting these two analytically distinct categories of costs together, one
can easily determine the pattern that should emerge from a common-law
system that (we may assume by hypothesis) seeks to fashion legal rules
48
promoting economic efficiency. First, one would predict that when
transaction costs are low, such a legal system would tend to adopt me-
chanical entitlement-determination rules. Mechanical rules entail lower
entitlement-determination costs than judgmental rules, and coupling low
transaction costs with low entitlement-determination costs should max-
imize mutually beneficial exchange or modification of property rights. But
when transaction costs are high, market exchange is unlikely to take
place, regardless of the choice of entitlement-determination rule. In these
circumstances, the economically efficient choice will depend on a com-
parison of two variables: the increase in entitlement-determination costs
entailed by a shift from a mechanical to a judgmental rule versus the
potential efficiency gains from allowing the court (or some other collec-
tive decision maker) to exercise discretion in resolving the dispute, rather
is larger than the plaintiffs, an out-of-court settlement will be reached rather quickly. See
Posner, supra note 45, at 436.
41 Of course, simply because positive entitlement-determination costs prevent certain
potentially advantageous agreements from being negotiated, this does not mean that the
decision to forgo litigation in favor of the status quo is inefficient. Entitlement-determination
costs, like transaction costs, are "real" costs and should not be incurred unless they are
justified by the expected returns. Compare Harold Demsetz, The Exchange and Enforce-
ment of Property Rights, 7 J. Law & Econ. 11 (1964) (making a similar point with regard to
transaction costs).
48 For a partial anticipation of the general thesis advanced here, see Posner, supra note
45, at 39-40 (contrasting "unqualified" right to exclude trespasses and "qualified" right to
exclude other intrusions such as engine sparks and suggesting that transaction costs explain
the difference in the law's treatment of these cases). More generally, many authors have
stressed the relationship between clear baseline rules and the facilitation of consensual
exchange and modification of property rights. See, for example, Richard A. Epstein, Notice
and Freedom of Contract in the Law of Servitudes, 55 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1353 (1982); James M.
Buchanan, Politics, Property, and the Law: An Alternative Interpretation of Miller et al. v.
Schoene, 15 J. Law & Econ. 439, 452 (1972).
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than adhering to whatever solution is dictated by a mechanical rule. If the
magnitude of the latter is larger than that of the former (which in many
situations I suspect it would be), then in high-transaction-cost situations it
will be economically efficient for a legal system to adopt judgmental enti-
tlement-determination rules.
In principle, these considerations are easy to apply to the law of
trespass and nuisance. Trespass is clearly a mechanical entitlement-
determination rule, and thus one would expect the law of trespass to
apply to disputes with low transaction costs. Nuisance, under either the
Restatement formulation or the doctrinal obscurantism and inconsistency
of the cases generally, is clearly a judgmental entitlement-determination
rule. Hence, one would expect the law of nuisance to apply to disputes
characterized by high transaction costs.
Testing this predicted relationship is another matter, however. It will
not do simply to compare reported cases involving trespass and nuisance
to see whether they involve high or low transaction costs. If low-
transaction-cost trespasses are more likely to be settled than high-
transaction-cost trespasses (as the theory would suggest), then reported
trespass decisions should contain a disproportionate number of high-
transaction-cost cases. On the other hand, if low transaction costs make it
easier not only to settle cases but also to engage in litigation (for example,
because of the collective-action problems of assembling large numbers of
plaintiffs or defendants, even with devices such as class actions), then
reported nuisance cases should contain a disproportionate number involv-
ing low transaction costs-especially since judgmental entitlement-
determination rules will tend to frustrate the settlement of low-
transaction-cost disputes. Thus, an examination of reported trespass and
nuisance decisions probably would not accurately reflect the underlying
sample of controversies.
Given this state of affairs, there may be only one way of testing the
predicted relationship, short of devising some method of sampling the
underlying universe of disputes directly. This is to examine the common-
law rules for determining the respective spheres of trespass and nuisance.
If these "threshold rules" differentiate, at least crudely, between high-
transaction-cost and low-transaction-cost situations, then they provide at
least partial corroboration of the model. How then do common-law courts
decide whether a particular intrusion is subject to the law of trespass or of
nuisance?
III. COMMON-LAw THRESHOLD TESTS
Four distinct threshold tests applied by common-law courts to delimit
the sphere of trespass from that of nuisance can be identified. Although
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each test has emerged at a different time in history, once having emerged
none has been completely supplanted by its successors. Indeed, all four of
these tests are still being invoked, either alone or in combination, in
modern judicial decisions.49
The first efforts to distinguish between trespass and nuisance date from
the time of the Year Books. There were then three primary forms of
recourse for intrusions on land:5° the various real actions, most promi-
nently the assize of novel disseisin; trespass quare clausum fregit, 5, a
variant of trespass vi et armis; and the assize of nuisance. The distinction
between trespass and nuisance depended on where the act giving rise to
the intrusion occurred. If the defendant's act (short of physical ouster
amounting to disseisin) occurred on the plaintiff's land, then the appropri-
ate action was in trespass. If, however, the defendant's act occurred on
the defendant's own land, then the proper action was in nuisance. "Thus,
to go on the plaintiff's land and demolish a weir was a trespass which gave
rise to the action of trespass: to stay on your own land and demolish a
weir to the hurt of the plaintiff was a nuisance for which the assize of
nuisance was the proper remedy. Nuisance could never be committed on
the plaintiff's land: an act done on the plaintiffs land would be disseisin or
trespass according to the circumstances."-
52
After the assize of nuisance fell into disuse and was, for all practical
purposes, replaced by the action on the case for nuisance, a second test
for differentiating between trespass and nuisance arose. This was based
on the distinction understood to characterize the difference between tres-
pass vi et armis and trespass on the case generally: that between "direct"
and "indirect" harms. As one eighteenth-century case put it: ". . . the
one must be brought for a wrong done immediately to the person or his
possession, the other for a consequential damage. . . . If logs are laid in
the highway by which any person is hurt, he must bring case; but if the
" For example, in Southport Corp. v. Esso Petroleum Co., [1954] 3 W.L.R. 200, 209,
Lord Denning appeared to invoke the earliest of the common-law tests, asserting that '[in
order to support an action for trespass to land the act done by the defendant must be a
physical act done by him directly on to the plaintiff's land." In an article published in 1931,
one commentator had stated, obviously prematurely, that "we hear no more of" this distinc-
tion in the reports after the seventeenth century. P. H. Winfield, Nuisance as a Tort, 4
Cambridge L. J. 189, 202 (193 1).
50 For a concise summary of the development of all three forms of recourse, see James
Barr Ames, Lectures on Legal History and Miscellaneous Essays 19 (1913). See also
A. W. B. Simpson, An Introduction to the History of the Land Law. ch. 2 (1961) (history of
real actions); J. H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, ch. 20 (2d ed. 1979)
(history of nuisance).
51 Trespass "because he broke the close."
52 F. H. Newark, The Boundaries of Nuisance, 65 Law Q. Rev. 480, 481-82 (1949).
" Winfield, supra note 49, at 201-2.
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hurt is by logs thrown at the person, he must bring trespass vi et armis."
54
Under this test, it was no longer true that the plaintiff could sue only in
nuisance for any act performed on the defendant's own property. For
example, if the defendant, while not leaving his own land, caused "filth
and stinking water" to flow onto the plaintiffs land, this could be consid-
ered a direct injury, and hence a trespass rather than a nuisance.55
The distinction between direct and indirect harms continues to play a
role, at least verbally, in differentiating trespass and nuisance in English
law, as well as in many American jurisdictions. But taken literally, the
test has difficulty accounting for the judicial system's actual categoriza-
tion of intrusions. Take, for instance, interference in the form of noise.
The generation of excessive noise is universally regarded as subject to the
law of nuisance rather than trespass,56 yet it is hard to see how this result
follows from the direct versus indirect criterion. If pouring "stinking
water" onto the plaintiffs land is a direct injury, then why is propelling
sound waves at the plaintiffs land not a direct injury? The same can be
said about shining light. Complaints about intrusions in the form of un-
wanted light are thought to give rise to an action for nuisance, 57 but why is
the hurling of electromagnetic waves at the plaintiff's land not a direct
rather than an indirect injury?
The difficulty of squaring the direct versus indirect harm distinction
with the actual categorization of intrusions eventually gave rise, at least in
many American jurisdictions, to a third threshold test: one based on the
physical dimensions of the agency or thing that invades the plaintiff's
property. According to this test, "[t]respass comprehends an actual phys-
ical invasion by tangible matter. An invasion which constitutes a nuisance
is usually by intangible substances, such as noise or odors." 58 This dimen-
sional test seems to reflect the actual categorization of intrusions better
than the direct versus indirect harm criterion. If Ihe defendant blasts
rocks onto the plaintiffs land, or fires a shotgun across the plaintiffs
land, this would constitute a trespass under the dimensional test: rocks
and shotgun pellets are particles which, at least once they come to rest,
are visible to the naked eye. In fact, these sorts of invasions are generally
5' Reynolds v. Clerk (1725) 8 Mod. 272, 276; 88 Eng. Rep. 193, 196 (Fortescue, J.).
'5 Preston v. Mercer (1656) 145 Eng. Rep. 380 (Ex.). The report says that the court
allowed the action in trespass only "after great wavering in opinion and arguings pro &
con." Id. at 381.
56 See, for example, Wilson v. Interlake Steel Co., 22 Cal. 3d 229; 185 Cal. Rptr. 280; 649
P.2d 922 (1982).
"7 See Amphitheaters, Inc. v. Portland Meadows, 184 Or. 336, 198 P.2d 847 (1948).
58 Ryan v. City of Emmetsburg, 232 Iowa 600, 603 N.W.2d 435 (1982); see generally
Fowler V. Harper & Fleming James, Jr., I The Law of Torts § 1.23 at 67 (1956).
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regarded as trespasses, at least by American courts. 5 9 However, smoke,
noise, odors, shining light, aesthetic blight, funeral homes, halfway
houses, and so forth would be actionable only as nuisances, because they
do not involve the invasion of particles which are visible to the naked eye.
Here again, the decided cases are usually in accord with what the dimen-
sional test would suggest. 6° The dimensional test also receives semiofficial
recognition in the standard definitions of trespass and nuisance. Trespass
is typically said to be an interference with the "exclusive possession" of
land; nuisance an interference with its "use and enjoyment."'" An intru-
sion that displaces the plaintiff from exclusive possession of his land is
almost invariably a tangible thing; less visible particles, while they may
interfere with use and enjoyment, will not, in any literal sense, physically
displace the plaintiff from occupying "his" space.
Despite an apparent capacity to explain the actual categorization of
intrusions, and its tacit recognition in the popular definitions of trespass
and nuisance, there are signs of judicial dissatisfaction with the dimen-
sional test.62 Perhaps this derives from a belief, consistent with the gen-
eral run of much modern tort doctrine, that a strict liability standard such
as trespass should be reserved for "serious" harms and a balancing or
cost-benefit approach such as nuisance limited to less serious harms.
Given our understanding of the effects of chemical or radiological expo-
sure, a court which assumes that strict liability should be reserved for
serious harms is apt to be impatient with a doctrine that treats a neighbor
who cuts across the lawn more severely than one who emits toxic gases or
radiation. Another and more cynical explanation-but one that actually
finds considerable support in the facts of the decided cases63 -is that
courts confronted with sympathetic plaintiffs have bent the traditional
definitions of trespass to give them the benefit of a longer statute of
limitations.
59 See Ashville Const. Co. v. Southern R. Co., 19 F.2d 32, 34 (4th Cir. 1927) (rocks
blasted onto plaintiffs land); Herrin v. Sutherland, 74 Mont. 587, 241 P. 328 (1925) (shotgun
fired over surface of plaintiffs land); Digirolamo v. Philadelphia Gun Club, 371 Pa. 40, 89
A.2d 357 (1952) (shotgun fired at plaintiffs land).
60 The classic illustration of this is provided by blasting cases holding that injuries caused
by rocks thrown by the concussion give rise to liability for trespass, whereas injuries caused
by vibrations from the concussion do not. See Gossett v. Southern Ry. Co., 115 Tenn. 376,
89 S.W. 737 (1905); Booth v. Rome, W. & O.T. R. Co., 140 N.Y. 267, 35 N.E. 592 (1893);
Benner v. Atlantic Dredging Co., 134 N.Y. 156, 31 N.E. 328 (1892).
61 See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821D, comment d. (1979); Donahue, Kauper, &
Martin, supra note 12, at 288.
62 For a collection of recent decisions, see Annot., 2 A.L.R.4th 1055 (1980).
63 This was the situation both in the leading Oregon case, Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co.,
221 Or. 86 (1959), 342 P.2d 790 (1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 918 (1960), and in a prominent
Alabama case, Borland v. Sanders Lead Co., 369 So. 2d 523 (Ala. 1979).
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For whatever reason, there is an emerging fourth threshold test for the
division between trespass and nuisance, one based on a distinction be-
tween a "mere" interference with use and enjoyment-which is governed
by nuisance-and an interference with use and enjoyment so severe that
it amounts to a "constructive" interference with exclusive possession-
which is governed by trespass. 64 For example, in Martin v. Reynolds
Metals Co.,65 the court held that the plaintiff, forced to abandon his farm
because of the invasion of invisible toxic gases, could maintain an action
in trespass. The court explained: "If, then, we must look to the character
of the instrumentality which is used in making an intrusion upon another's
land, we prefer to emphasize the object's energy or force rather than its
size. Viewed in this way we may define trespass as any intrusion which
invades the possessor's interest in exclusive possession, whether that
intrusion is by visible or invisible pieces of matter or by energy which can
be measured only by the mathematical language of the physicist.
' 
66
This fourth threshold test is difficult to square with the traditional sub-
stantive law of trespass. First, as courts applying this approach have
recognized, an intrusion that does not literally deprive the plaintiff of
exclusive possession can be said to do so constructively only if it does
substantial damage to the property. 67 Thus, the "modern theory of tres-
pass," as one court called it, 68 requires a showing of substantial harm,
much like the law of nuisance. Second, as the Martin court conceded,
6 The development of the fourth test for distinguishing between trespass and nuisance is
thus reminiscent of the development of the doctrine of constructive eviction in landlord-
tenant law. At common law, a tenant had an implied convenant of "quiet enjoyment," but
did not have an implied warranty of habitability. Quiet enjoyment was originally understood
to mean that the landlord could not physically oust the tenant during the term of the lease.
See I American Law of Property § 3.53 (A. James Casner ed. 1952). Gradually, however,
courts expanded this notion, holding that when the landlord committed acts that seriously
interfered with the value of the leasehold, then the tenant would be deemed to have been
"constructively evicted" in violation of the implied convenant of quiet enjoyment. See
Bruckner v. Helfaer, 197 Wis. 582, 222 N.W. 790 (1929); Phyfe v. Dale, 72 Misc. 383, 130
N.Y.S. 231 (App. Term 1911). The notion that interference with the value of a leasehold, if
sufficiently severe, can amount to an interference with a covenant of quiet enjoyment is
analogous to the notion that interference with the use and enjoyment of land, if sufficiently
severe, can amount to a trespass. There is one sense, however, in which the analogy is
incomplete. In order to invoke the doctrine of constructive eviction, the tenant typically
must vacate the leasehold. See R. Schoshinski, American Law of Landlord and Tenant § 3.5
(1980). The courts that have held that interference with use and enjoyment can amount to a
"constructive" trespass have not, however, required that the plaintiff vacate the premises in
order to maintain the action. See Borland v. Sanders Lead Co., 369 So. 2d 523 (Ala. 1979).
65 221 Or. 86, 342 P.2d 790 (1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 918 (1960).
66 221 Or. at 94, 342 P.2d at 794.
67 Borland v. Sanders Lead Co., 369 So. 2d 523, 527 (Ala. 1979).
68 Id.
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deciding what kinds of interferences amount to a constructive denial of
possession entails a "weighing process, similar to that involved in the law
of nuisance."-69 In other words, the fourth test appears to introduce,
through the threshold definition of what constitutes a trespass, ajudgmen-
tal standard very much like the rule of nuisance.
If this portrayal is accurate, then those courts which accept the fourth
test are faced with a dilemma. On the one hand, they can maintain a
distinction between "traditional" forms of trespass and "modern tres-
pass." The former would require no showing of harm and would be gov-
erned by a rule of strict liability; the latter would require a showing of
substantial harm and would be governed by a weighing approach similar
to the law of nuisance. On the other hand, these courts could simply
dispense altogether with the traditional trespass doctrine, thereby sub-
jecting all forms of interference to a judgmental rule like nuisance. So far,
the courts adopting the fourth test have opted for the first alternative.
70
Yet having done so, they now must come up with some neit' threshold test
to distinguish between those sorts of intrusions governed by the mechani-
cal standard of traditional trespass and those governed by the judgmental
standard of modern trespass. Thus, the extension of the traditional
definition of trespass to include constructive interference with exclusive
possession simply poses again the original question how we distinguish
between trespass and nuisance. In the final analysis, the change of labels
does not modify the boundary between mechanical and judgmental rules
for determining a landholder's right to exclude intrusions by others. 7 ,
To what extent do these various common-law threshold rules differ-
entiate between situations characterized by low or high transaction costs?
I think that all three of the traditional tests tend to isolate, at least crudely,
disputes characterized by low transaction costs. To be sure, the tests do
not directly inquire into transaction costs, nor do they inevitably differ-
entiate intrusions along transaction-cost lines. But the transaction-cost/
entitlement-determination-cost model does not demand that the common
law embrace a rule that always governs intrusions by trespass when mar-
ket transactions are feasible and by nuisance when they are not. Such a
69 221 Or. at 96, 342 P.2d at 795.
70 See Reter v. Talent Irrigation District, 258 Or. 140, 482 P.2d 170, 172 (1971) (refusing to
apply the balancing test of Martin to a case falling within "the traditional pattern of tres-
pass"); Borland v. Sanders Lead Co., 369 So. 2d 523 (Ala. 1979) (dictum) ("direct" inva-
sions still subject to liability regardless of whether there is substantial harm).
7' This is especially apparent in Borland, where the court stated that for direct invasions
"actual damages need not be shown" and, if the invasion is intentional, strict liability
applies; whereas for indirect invasions there must be "substantial damages to the res" and
an invasion that affects an interest in the exclusive possession of property. 369 So. 2d at 529.
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rule would itself dramatically increase entitlement-determination costs,
because of the judgmental character of deciding case by case whether
market transactions are feasible. On the contrary, the model suggests
that, in order to preserve the advantages of a mechanical entitlement-
determination rule, the law would gravitate toward a mechanical
threshold test for deciding whether to apply trespass or nuisance. The
model further suggests that the price of a mechanical threshold test will be
a somewhat imperfect fit between the choice of entitlement-determination
rule and the magnitude of transaction costs.
The earliest rule, based on where the defendant's act occurs, is highly
mechanical and delineates a category of controversies usually character-
ized by low transaction costs: those arising when the defendant person-
ally enters onto the plaintiffs land. In this sort of situation, it should not
be hard to identify the parties to the dispute. Certainly, identification
should be easy where the dispute is between neighboring landholders.
Although it may be difficult for the landholder to make an identification
where the intruder is a stranger,72 it should not be that difficult for the
intruder to identify with whom he must deal-the person in possession,
the landholder. Since the law gives the landholder an unqualified right to
exclude, the intruder should know that he will have to initiate negotiations
with the landholder or face virtual certainty of legal expulsion. In addi-
tion, the number of parties is apt to be small. Generally speaking, there
will be only one or at most a few possessors of land, and the possessor can
deal with intruders or potential intruders one at a time. 73 Finally, any
actual entry by an intruder poses few problems of monitoring, so that
legal enforcement should not, as a rule, be difficult.74 Unfortunately, the
72 In the context of discussing decisions involving the use of spring guns to protect
property from intruders, Richard Posner has stated that "the cost of transacting is normally
prohibitive. It is not feasible for the landowner to contract with the potential trespasser or
the potential trespasser with the landowner." Richard A. Posner, Killing or Wounding to
Protect a Property Interest, 14 J. Law & Econ. 201, 224 (1971). Granted, it may be prohibi-
tive for the landholder to negotiate with strangers intent on trespassing on his or her land.
But it should not be that difficult for putative trespassers to initiate negotiations with the
landholder, as suggested by the relative ease with which hunters can obtain the permission
of farmers to hunt on their land. Compare Posner, supra note 45 (recognizing low transac-
tion costs when a neighbor trespasses on the land of another).
73 In this connection, it is significant that the action for trespass is limited to possessors of
land rather than those with nonpossessory interests. See note 8 supra. A potential trespasser
will usually have little difficulty identifying the possessor of land: the possessor is the
occupant or the one who has the right to occupy the land as against all others. See Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts § 157 (1965). Thus, limiting the action of trespass to possessors helps
to minimize the difficulty of identifying the parties to the dispute and hence to minimize
transaction costs.
71 See John Umbeck, A Theory of Contract Choice and the California Gold Rush, 20 J.
Law & Econ. 421, 424 (1977).
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test is underinclusive, for it omits a large range of intrusions where, while
there is no personal entry by the defendant, the transaction costs of
reaching a negotiated solution should be small.
The second threshold test, based on the distinction between direct and
indirect injury, also appears on its face to invoke a mechanical standard.
In practice, however, the notion of "directness" has proven to be quite
slippery. The firing of bullets and blasting of rocks onto the plaintiff's
property have been held to constitute direct injuries, but the shining of
light or blaring of noise have been deemed to be indirect injuries. The
concept of "directness" seems therefore to incorporate an unstated judg-
mental gloss. The direct/indirect distinction also does fairly well in captur-
ing low-transaction-cost situations, but again has its limitations. Insofar
as many direct injuries will involve a personal invasion by the defendant
onto the plaintiff's property, the distinction covers the same ground as the
first test. In addition, the directness test will capture certain interferences
originating outside the plaintiffs property-such as intentional flooding
or blasting-that also probably entail low transaction costs. Yet if we take
the direct-interference criterion literally, it would extend to such phenom-
ena as vibrations, noise, and shining light-interferences that, at least in
populated areas, are apt to involve the difficulties typical of high transac-
tion-cost settings: problems of identification, multiple parties, and the
need for long-term monitoring or enforcement mechanisms. Thus, the
threshold test either breaks down into a judgmental rule or is overin-
clusive.
The third common-law threshold test, that based on the dimension of
the particles involved in the intrusion, may actually do the best job of
mechanically singling out interferences characterized by low transaction
costs. To be sure, if the dimensional test were understood to mean that
the invading material must satisfy some vague standards such as "sub-
stantiality," it would degenerate into indeterminacy. (Must it be bigger
than a cannonball? Bigger than a bullet?) But the implicit understanding
seems to have been that trespass is reserved for substances which, when
stationary, are visible to the naked eye.75 This is a highly mechanical
standard which can almost always be applied without recourse to litiga-
tion. Invasion by rocks is clearly a trespass; invasion by colorless gas is
clearly not. The only borderline cases would involve dense smoke con-
taining particulate matter such as soot, which may or may not contain
individual particles visible to the eye.
In terms of singling out interferences characterized by low transaction
75 See Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 221 Or. 86, 93, 342 P. 2d 790, 793 (1959), cert.
denied, 362 U.S. 918 (1960).
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costs, the virtues of the dimensional test reside, first of all, in reducing
uncertainties about the identity of the parties to the dispute. The source of
things large enough to be visible to the naked eye-buildings, cars, boul-
ders, flooding, and so forth-is relatively easy to trace, and hence both
the party responsible for the intrusion and the parcels subject to the
intrusion should be easy to match. Moreover, since visible things are
generally not carried for long distances, disputes over such intrusions are
likely to involve smaller numbers of parties-typically adjacent landhol-
ders. Finally, in contrast to interferences involving invisible agents-gas,
noise, halfway houses, and so forth-interferences involving visible
things are probably more likely to involve problems that can be solved
without the need for some long-term monitoring or enforcement mecha-
nism. Admittedly, the dimensional test is somewhat underinclusive-it is
easy to think of cases involving intangible invasions that would not entail
difficulties or identification, large numbers, or problems of contractual
enforcement. But the lack of fit may be less severe here than it is in the
case of the two earlier common-law standards.
The only threshold test that does not differentiate between high- and
low-transaction-cost situations with any degree of success is the "modern
theory" espoused by Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co. and the decisions
following it. The distinction between a constructive interference with
exclusive possession and an interference with mere use and enjoyment of
property is ajudgmental rather than a mechanical test, and thus from the
outset it tends to frustrate the objective of facilitating the exchange and
modification of property rights. Moreover, there would seem to be no
correlation between invasions which constructively interfere with exclu-
sive possession and low transaction costs. Air pollution-such as the
fluoride gas involved in Martin-may constructively "oust" the plaintiff
from possession, but may also involve large numbers of people; can pre-
sent difficult problems in identifying those who are the source or who are
affected by it; and may well require as part of its resolution some long-
term monitoring or enforcement mechanism.76
In sum, the common-law threshold tests for determining the respective
spheres of trespass and nuisance provide at least some corroboration for
the transaction-cost/entitlement-determination-cost model. The dimen-
sional test probably does the best job of differentiating between high- and
low-transaction-cost situations, while preserving the character of trespass
as a highly mechanical entitlement-determination rule. Significantly, with-
out ever formally renouncing earlier tests, the common law has tended to
76 See Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 225-26, 257 N.E.2d 870, 873, 309
N.Y.S.2d 312, 316-17 (1970).
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evolve in the direction of the dimensional standard. Certain modern deci-
sions, which purport to modify the dimensional test in favor of the idea of
interference with constructive exclusive possession, are not inconsistent
with this conclusion. In practice, these decisions require a new threshold
test to differentiate between "traditional" and "modern" trespass, and
there is authority to the effect that courts will adopt one of the three
traditional common-law tests to perform this function.77 Thus, even
though there have been expressions of dissatisfaction with the mechanical
threshold tests, they continue to determine the dividing line between
mechanical and judgmental standards for establishing the landholder's
right to exclude. The seemingly arbitrary character of the rule has persis-
tent features that render it both desirable and attractive.
IV. OTHER APPLICATIONS
Even if the transaction-cost/entitlement-determination-cost model can
account for the respective spheres of trespass and nuisance, it does not
necessarily follow that it offers the only explanation for the persistence of
these two different types of rules for the determination of property
rights.7 8 Clearly, the model's plausibility would be enhanced if it helped
explain other issues involving the determination of property rights. In this
section, I will attempt to suggest some other ways in which the potential
for contractual exchange or modification of property rights may help to
account for the nature of entitlement-determination rules.
The right to exclude suggests several situations where the mechanical
standard of trespass seems to be required, but in fact the law adopts a
judgmental rule. Airplane overflights provide a particular striking illustra-
tion of this sort of "exception" to the ordinary rules. Under a literal
" Borland v. Sanders Lead Co., 369 So. 2d 523 (Ala. 1979) (direct versus indirect test).
78 An alternative explanation, suggested to me by readers of this paper, is based on a
distinction between acts of pure expropriation of resources (which are or should be subject
to trespass) and acts in which resources are taken as a byproduct or spillover from some
other form of productive activity (which are or should be governed by nuisance). However,
whatever attractions this distinction may have as a normative matter, I am not convinced
that it provides an adequate account of the division established by the common law. Take for
instance the two decisions cited as examples in Section I supra. The case where the land-
owner's agents repeatedly drive trucks on the neighbor's property could be described just as
easily as a "spillover" from a form of productive activity as it could be described as a form
of expropriation, and yet it is clearly governed by trespass. On the other hand, the case
where the factory owner decides to operate at night, even though he knows this will disturb
the sleep of others, could be described as an expropriation of a resource (peace and quiet)
belonging to others just as easily as a spillover, and yet it is clearly governed by nuisance.
Thus the distinction between "thievery" and "mere external effects" is too indeterminate
to account for the dividing line established in practice.
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application of the ad coelum rule, an overflight would constitute a tres-
pass under any of the three traditional threshold tests: it involves an
actual, direct, and visible entry into the column of space belonging to the
surface owner. 79 Acquisition of the appropriate easements to permit an
overflight, however, would obviously entail monumental transaction
costs. The owner of the airplane would have great difficulty identifying
the various parcels of property traversed by the flight path; the number of
parties with which agreements would have to be negotiated would be
immense; and the parties would face formidable difficulty detecting and
proving violations. The model clearly suggests that the mechanical
entitlement-determination rule of trespass is inappropriate in this context.
The common law could have solved the problem of overflights by sim-
ply tinkering with the ad coelum rule. Trespass (unlike nuisance) is avail-
able only to one who is a "possessor" (as opposed to merely a
nonpossessing owner) of land, and courts could have held that although
the holder of the surface rights "owns" up to the heavens, he does not
possess any more of the column of space than he has occupied (for ex-
ample, by building a skyscraper). 80 Thus, the surface owner would be left
with an action for nuisance, which would ultimately fail because of the
absence of significant harm. For whatever reason, the common law did
not tend to adopt this neat solution, preferring instead an ad hoc excep-
tion for overflights. As the Restatement dutifully notes: "Flight by air-
craft in the air space above the land of another is a trespass if, but only if,
(a) it enters into the immediate reaches of the air space next to the land,
and (b) it interferes substantially with the other's use and enjoyment of his
land."- 81 Predictably, in a high-transaction-cost situation, the mechanical
entitlement-determination rule of trespass has been replaced by a judg-
mental standard that looks very much like the law of nuisance.
Another exception, again consistent with the model, involves uninten-
tional trespasses. Suppose A and B are driving, cars that collide on a
public highway, and the force of the collision propels B's car onto C's
land, damaging the lawn and bushes. This, like most problems involving
traffic accidents, is a high-transaction-cost situation. Advance negotia-
tions between B and C are out of the question, since the costs to B of
identifying and negotiating with all possessors of land onto which he may
79 See Burnham v. Beverly Airways, 311 Mass. 628, 42 N.E.2d 575 (1942). Compare
United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 260-61 (1946) (seeking to avoid this conclusion by
declaring that the usque ad coelum doctrine "has no place in the modern world").
80 See Hinman v. Pacific Air Transport, 84 F.2d 755, 758 (9th Cir. 1936); Epstein, supra
note 20, at 81.
81 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 159 (2) (1965) (emphasis added).
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some day be forced to drive his car would be prohibitive. 82 Thus in this
situation, the model would predict that the law would apply a judgmental
rather than a mechanical entitlement-determination rule.
In fact, the modern trend has been to reject a mechanical rule when the
intrusion is neither intended nor known to be substantially certain to
follow from the defendant's act, even though historically all trespasses
were governed by one standard. 83 According to the Restatement, for ex-
ample, an unintentional trespass is actionable only if the invasion causes
"harm" and only if the defendant acted "recklessly or negligently, or as a
result of an abnormally dangerous activity."" Standards like "reckless-
ness" and "negligence" (or "abnormally dangerous activity" for that
matter) involve judgmental rather than mechanical entitlement-
determination rules. Hence, as the model would predict, trespasses that
tend to involve high transaction costs are governed by judgmental entitle-
ment-determination rules.
The converse situation also exists: cases in which one might assume
that a judgmental entitlement-determination rule would apply, yet which
are in fact governed by a mechanical standard such as strict liability. One
illustration of this is innocent building encroachments-cases in which
the defendant erects a structure in the belief that it is on his own land, but
it turns out to be on someone else's. At the time of construction, the
encroachment is not intentional, and hence one might suppose that the
intrusion would be subjected to the judgmental rule of unintentional tres-
pass. Nevertheless, both the case law 86 and the Restatement 87 are quite
clear in treating innocent building encroachments as an intentional tres-
pass, subject to a rule of strict liability.
82 Likewise, the costs to C of identifying and negotiating with all drivers who might
someday drive on his land would be prohibitive.
83 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 165 (1965); Prosser, supra note II, at 63-65.
8 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 165 (1965).
85 Other "exceptions" to the standard mechanical rule of trespass can be explained in
terms of the potential for strategic bargaining created when one or more parties stand in a
monopoly or near-monopoly position relative to other parties. I would include within this
category such diverse things as the qualified privilege for entry under circumstances of
emergency, see Ploof v. Putnam, 81 Vt. 471, 71 A. 188 (1908); the privilege for entry by
government service workers into migrant labor camps, see State v. Shack, 58 N.J. 297; 277
A.2d 369 (1971); the doctrine of easement by necessity or implication, for example, Adams
v. Cullen, 44 Wash. 2d 502, 268 P.2d 451 (1954); and the grant of the power of eminent
domain to private entrepreneurs to allow them to assemble large tracts of land, Poletown
Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 304 N.W.2d 455 (1981).
' See Geragosian v. Union Reality Co., 289 Mass. 104, 193 N.E. 726 (1935); Pile v.
Pedrick, 167 Pa. 296, 31 A. 646 (1895).
" Restatement (Second) of Torts § 164 (1965).
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This is consistent with the model. Unlike other sorts of unintentional
trespass, building encroachments involve low transaction costs, at least
when viewed ex ante-before the encroachment takes place. If the
builder needs to purchase an additional strip of land from a neighbor, the
costs of identification, coordination, and enforcement should all be low.
Nor would we expect to find insuperable problems of strategic bargaining
here, given that the builder has the options of redesigning or relocating the
building or moving elsewhere. Of course, if we view the situation ex post,
after the encroaching structure is built, there is an obvious potential for
strategic bargaining: the neighbor now has a monopoly on something the
builder desperately needs-title to the land on which the building sits. But
it makes sense to adopt an entitlement-determination rule keyed to the ex
ante situation. The costs to the builder of acquiring the necessary infor-
mation to avoid an encroachment are almost certainly quite low relative
to the value of the building itself: all he has to do is commission a lot
survey before construction begins. Thus, adopting an entitlement-
determination rule that treats the builder as if he had knowledge creates a
powerful incentive for the builder to make sure he does have knowledge.
A mechanical rule of strict liability therefore performs two functions here:
it has an in terrorem effect that induces the builder to find out whether he
needs to negotiate with a neighbor, and it provides a baseline principle
from which those negotiations can take place.88
Another illustration is provided by the common-law doctrine related to
straying livestock. The common law did not treat straying livestock as a
simple case of intentional trespass, perhaps because the wandering of
livestock did not fit neatly within the direct versus indirect threshold test
traditionally favored by English courts. Nevertheless, the common law
was quite firm in subjecting straying cases to a rule of strict liability
similar to the law of intentional trespass. 89 In fact, the law here was, if
anything, more mechanical than ordinary trespass, given the availability
of the self-help remedy of distress damage feasant, which allows a land-
holder to hold intruding animals as security for compensation.' Applica-
tion of mechanical rules here is predictable, given the nature of disputes
88 Athough innocent encroachments are uniformly subject to a rule of strict liability, there
is a discernible trend toward applying the "balancing of equities" before enjoining the
builder to remove the structure. See Annot., 28 A.L.R.2d 679, 705 (1953). To the extent
courts follow this approach, they dilute the incentive effects created by a property rule, and
increase entitlement determination costs, because of the difficulty of distinguishing between
wilful and innocent encroachments.
89 Prosser, supra note 11, at 496-97.
9 See Richard A. Epstein, Charles Gregory, & Harry Kalven, Cases and Materials on
Torts 567 (4th ed. 1984).
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involving straying livestock. Domestic animals such as cattle and sheep
are unlikely to stray very far, and identification of the possessory interests
with which they are likely to interfere should not be difficult. Moreover,
contractual solutions to straying problems (such as an informal agreement
to fence) are unlikely to require elaborate enforcement mechanisms.
Thus, the use of mechanical entitlement-determination rules renders a
common "spillover" problem virtually self-regulating.
To be sure, the fact that a mechanical entitlement-determination rule is
appropriate in this context does not resolve the question of which party
should have the entitlement. Interestingly, there has been a split in posi-
tions, with England and most eastern states adopting a fencing-in rule and
many western states adopting a fencing-out rule. The difference can be
explained in terms of which baseline rule is likely to require the fewest
contractual modifications. Thus, where there are many farmers and few
ranchers, a fencing-in rule is appropriate; conversely, when there are
many ranchers and few farmers, a fencing-out rule makes more sense. 9'
Indeed, as western states have become more cultivated, many have
enacted legislation returning to the English rule. 92
The extension of the straying livestock cases to other "escaping" sub-
stances in Rylands v. Fletcher93 provides yet another illustration. Rylands
has generally been confined to serious, nonrecurring accidents that inter-
fere with interests in land. Ordinarily, these sorts of accidents would be
governed by a judgmental rule such as negligence. 94 However, the doc-
trine of Rylands, at least as it has been applied in England, provides that
when such an accident is caused by a "nonnatural" use of land by an
adjacent landowner, strict liability governs.95 The impulse to apply strict
liability in these circumstances may be explained by the model. The fact
that Rylands cases involve, for the most part, adjacent landowners, limits
the problems of identifying parties and the number of disputants and thus
normally results in low transaction costs. The requirement that the source
91 See Donald Wittman, Liability for Harm or Restitution for Benefit? 13 J. Legal Stud.
57, 58 n.3 (1984).
92 Prosser, supra note 11, at 497.
93 (1865) 3 H. & C. 774, 159 Eng. Rep. 737, rev'd, (1866) L.R. I Ex. 265, aff'd in Rylands
v. Fletcher (1868) L.R. 3 H.L. 330.
9 Trespass was thought to be inapplicable in Rylands because the invasion was "indi-
rect"; nuisance was inapplicable because the interference was not a continuing one. See
William Lloyd Prosser, Selected Topics on the Law of Torts 135-36 (1953). In cases where
the invasion was clearly "direct," such as an exploding boiler, trespass would presumably
lie, but under modem doctrine it would be an unintentional trespass (because of the absence
of prior knowledge), which as we have seen is also governed by a judgmental standard.
'5 See Newark, supra note 52, at 488, and cases collected in W. T. S. Stallybrass, Danger-
ous Things and the Non-natural User of Land, 3 Cambridge L. J. 376, 393-94 (1929).
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of the interference be a nonnatural use is more ambiguous, but perhaps it
can be seen as confining the application of strict liability to situations
presenting relatively low information costs: if "nonnatural" means some-
thing that stands out as a prominent potential hazard, then the parties-or
at least the party harboring the potential hazard-should be aware of the
need to reach an understanding about preventive or precautionary mea-
sures or at least some decision about who should insure against the risk.
There are two problems with the Rylands doctrine, however, that help
to explain both its uneven reception in America 96 and its subsequent
transformation into a judgmental entitlement-determination rule. First,
the limitation of interferences between adjacent landowners was only
implicit in the English cases,9 7 and American lawyers (understandably)
sought to extend the rule to other situations involving high transaction
costs, with at least some success. 98 Second, even if the concept of "non-
natural use"-in the sense of something which stands out as a potential
hazard-could be said to delineate a clear set of phenomena against the
backdrop of rural nineteenth-century England, it clearly had no easily
confined meaning in the context of a rapidly industrializing America. Both
of these problems have vitiated almost any utility the doctrine may have
had in facilitating private solutions to land use disputes in America. In
most states, therefore, the initial response was to reject the doctrine of
Rylands in favor of the law of negligence. 99 More recently, the doctrine
has grown in acceptance, but only after being transformed into something
the Restatement calls liability for "abnormally dangerous activities." As
defined by the Restatement, this is not a mechanical rule, but ajudgmen-
tal rule somewhat along the lines of the law of nuisance.' 00 Given that in
96 Prosser, supra note 11, at 508-09.
97 Newark, supra note 52, at 488. It is interesting in this regard that it did not occur to
anyone in nineteenth-century England to apply the strict liability rule of Rylands to bursting
dams or conflagrations-both of which probably involve large numbers and hence high
transaction costs. See A, W. B. Simpson, Legal Liability for Bursting Reservoirs: The
Historical Context of Rylands v. Fletcher, 13 J. Legal Stud. 209 (1984). The implicit limita-
tion of Rylands to adjacent landowners finds an interesting parallel in the area of conflagra-
tions, where some nineteenth-century courts adopted the position that a landowner would
be held liable for a fire that destroyed adjacent property but not for destruction of more
remote property. See Ryan v. New York Central R.R. Co., 35 N.Y. 210, 91 Am. Dec. 49
(1866). This doctrine was based on the notion that the more extensive destruction was not
foreseeable.
98 For an extreme case, see Siegler v. Kuhlman, 81 Wash. 2d 448, 502 P.2d 1181 (1972)
(applying Rylands to a highway accident involving exploding gasoline truck).
99 See, for example, Marshall v. Welwood (1876) 38 N.J. L. Repts. 339; see generally
Prosser, supra note I1, at 509.
"o Restatement (Second) of Torts § 520 (1976). The following factors are listed as being
pertinent to determining whether an activity is "abnormally dangerous": the "(a) existence
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America the doctrine either was not confined to low-transaction-cost situ-
ations, or if so confined was not limited to a set of easily defined circum-
stances, this development is consistent with what the model would pre-
dict.
Turning to issues involving the right to consume or use property, there
is also evidence of the transaction-cost/entitlement-determination-cost
model at work. For example, much of the doctrine used to resolve con-
flicts arising when ownership of property is divided among two or more
persons can be explained by the model. With respect to concurrent inter-
ests-such as tenancies in common or joint tenancies-common-law
courts have long been reluctant to arbitrate disputes concerning the use or
consumption of property. Instead, courts have followed the rule that any
concurrent owner can, at any time and for any reason, petition for parti-
tion of the property. 'c The partition action is a mechanical entitlement-
determination rule, in that the right to obtain partition is virtually abso-
lute-the court will generally entertain no objections or defenses from the
other concurrent owners. 0 2 This is as one would expect, given that the
costs of reaching a mutual accommodation among concurrent owners
(who are often members of the same family, such as husband and wife or
siblings) should be low. Indeed, when the number of concurrent owners
gets too large, the law of partition tends to favor the transformation of the
pattern of ownership into one where the transaction costs are more
manageable.
When the ownership of property is divided over time, however, the
common law embraces quite different principles. For example, when
ownership of a parcel is divided between a life estate and one or more
remainders, the law of partition does not apply to resolve disputes over
the use or consumption of the property. Instead, courts apply a judgmen-
tal entitlement-determination rule known as the law of waste.' 03 Applica-
of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or chattels of others; (b) likelihood
that the harm that results from it will be great; (c) inability to eliminate the risk by the
exercise of reasonable care; (d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage;
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on; and (f) extent to
which its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous attributes.... "
l'O 2 American Law of Property § 6.26 (A. James Casner ed. 1952).
102 Id.
103 Originally, the law of waste was fairly mechanical in operation, forbidding any mate-
rial change in the nature and character of the property by the tenant. See Brock v. Dole, 66
Wis. 142, 28 N.W. 334 (1886). Over time, however, it has gradually evolved into ajudgmen-
tal rule, with courts looking at such factors as the duration of the present possessory
interest, the remoteness of the remainder or reversionary interest, whether the surrounding
area has changed, and whether (significantly) the modification by the tenant will enhance or
detract from the value of the property. See, for example, Melms v. Pabst Brewing Co., 104
Wis. 7, 79 N.W.W. 738 (1899).
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tion of ajudgmental rule when interests are divided over time is consistent
with the model, because future interest holders are likely to be dispersed
and numerous, and in many cases are not even born.'04 Thus the transac-
tion-cost barriers involved in negotiating a settlement between holders of
the life estate and the remaindermen may be prohibitive. A judgmental
rule is necessary in these situations to insure an efficient solution to
disputes over the use of the property.
A related pattern can be discerned in the area of promises respecting
the use of land. Between the contracting parties such promises are en-
forceable to the same extent that any contract is enforceable. 105 The very
existence of the contract indicates that transaction costs are low, and
provided adequate notice has been given of the existence and terms of the
promise, it should be enforced according to its terms. 106 But it is another
matter when the contracting parties attempt to bind their successors to
the terms of the agreement. If all we were concerned about were two-
party transactions between the promisor's successors and the promisee's
successors, there would be no problem: if one or both successors did not
like the original agreement, either because of changed tastes or changed
circumstances, they could negotiate a release. In cases involving subdivi-
sions and similar developments of land, however, real convenants and
servitudes frequently bind multiple parcels of property, and each property
owner is given a veto over modifications proposed by any other. Given
the potential for holding out that such a unanimity rule creates, this is a
classic high-transaction-cost situation.
Not surprisingly, therefore, promises that purport to run with the land
are subject to judicial scrutiny under a highly uncertain and complex set
of rules concerning intent, notice, "horizontal" and "vertical" privity,
whether or not the promise "touches and concerns" the land, and
"changed circumstances.' 0 7 The net effects of this body of law is to
create ajudgmental entitlement-determination rule giving courts a consid-
erable degree of discretion as to whether to enforce any particular prom-
ise against successors. To be sure, this judgmental rule is probably over-
broad, since it applies both to subdivision-type agreements and to simple
two-party agreements and is not restricted to the problem of changed
'04 This point, and the general point about the economic significance of the law of waste,
is noted in Posner, supra note 45, at 53.
i05 Richard R. Powell & Patrick J. Rohan, 5 Powell on Real Property 670[2] (1981).
106 See Epstein, supra note 48.
107 For a general discussion of these requirements see Uriel Reichman, Toward a Unified
Concept of Servitudes, 55 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1177 (1982); Susan F. French, Toward a Modern
Law of Servitudes: Reweaving the Ancient Strands, id. at 1261.
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circumstances. Nevertheless, some kind of judgmental entitlement-
determination rule is necessary in this context in order to overcome the
collective action barriers to eliminating a promise that has outlived its
usefulness. 108
Finally, the contrast between mechanical and judgmental entitlement-
determination rules sheds light on yet another stick in the bundle of rights
known as property-the right to compensation for government takings. In
declaring that "[t]here is no set formula to determine where regulation
ends and taking begins," 09 the Supreme Court in recent years has applied
a multifactorial balancing test to determine when the government has so
diminished the value of property as to exact a compensable taking. "10 This
doctrine is widely acknowledged to confer a broad range of discretion on
courts;".' what we have, in other words, is a judgmental entitlement-
determination rule.
Under the model proposed herein, the Supreme Court's formula may
be a response to a situation characterized by high transaction costs. And
indeed, it appears that the Court's judgmental standard has emerged in
cases involving general regulations or land use ordinances where the costs
of identifying affected individuals and reaching an accord on the amount
of compensation are substantial. What courts really do in "inverse con-
demnation" suits, at least according to an economic analysis, is weigh the
social costs of denying compensation against the settlement costs (trans-
action costs of identifying all affected property owners and reaching an
agreement as to the amount of compensation) and decide whether, on
balance, the government action should be deemed a taking." 2 Use of a
judgmental entitlement-determination rule obviously facilitates this sort
of calculus.
Not all takings cases involve high transaction costs, however. For ex-
ample, suppose the government institutes a formal eminent domain pro-
ceeding to condemn two dozen contiguous parcels of farmland for a
highway. Although a private highway-building entity might encounter in-
'0o See Reichman, supra note 107, at 1233; French, supra note 107 at 1314; James Krier,
Book Review, 122 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1664, 1678-80 (1974). Compare Epstein, supra note 48
(arguing that the interests of successors will be adequately protected in this context by the
original contracting parties).
"o Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962).
... Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
11 See, for example, Richard A. Epstein, Not Deference, But Doctrine: The Eminent
Domain Clause, 1982 Sup. Ct. Rev. 351, 354-56.
12 For the original exposition of this thesis see Frank Michelman, Property, Utility, and
Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 Harv. L.
Rev. 1165, 1214-18 (1967).
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superable holdout problems in this situation, the government's power of
eminent domain has the ability to overcome these sorts of transaction
costs. In fact, once the government has asserted its right to condemn the
property, the remaining transaction costs-identification of the affected
parties, negotiation of a price, and so forth-should generally be low.113
Thus, if it is possible to identify a class of government actions (analogous
to formal condemnation proceedings) where transaction costs are low
relative to the social costs of denying compensation, it would make sense
to jettison the judgmental rule for what constitutes a taking and establish a
mechanical rule. Use of a mechanical rule in these circumstances would
eliminate litigation over whether the action is a compensable taking, and
facilitate a negotiated settlement of the only issue between the parties-
the amount of compensation owing.
The attractiveness of the mechanical rule appears to have influenced
the Supreme Court's recent decision in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhat-
tan CATV Corp."14 The Court there held that a permanent physical occu-
pation of property by the government should always be regarded as a
taking, no matter what the multifactorial balancing standard otherwise
might suggest. In other words, the Court established that permanent oc-
cupations-like formal invocations of the power of eminent domain-are
to be governed by a mechanical rather than a judgmental rule. Such a
ruling is consistent with the model. As the Court observed, the practical
effect of a permanent occupation is similar to that of a formal taking. " 5 In
addition, the transaction costs will usually be low. A permanent occupa-
tion is a traditional trespass, and hence involves few if any problems in
identifying the affected parties and so forth. Consequently, a rule treating
all permanent occupations as takings will eliminate possible litigation over
the government's liability to pay compensation, facilitating a settlement
of the issue of the amount of compensation owing."
16
..3 The few empirical studies of eminent domain suggest that approximately 85 percent of
all proceedings are settled before trial. See Curtis J. Berger & Patrick J. Rohan, The Nassau
County Study: An Empirical Look into the Practices of Condemnation, 67 Colum. L. Rev.
430, 440, 458 n.60 (1967).
114 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
"' Id. at 436-37.
116 The principal economic justification for the power of eminent domain is that it is
necessary to overcome transaction-cost barriers that might prevent the government from
acquiring property in the open market. See Posner, supra note 45, at 40-41. Thus, when the
government must assemble many adjacent parcels, or a parcel uniquely suited to some
government project, it may encounter holdout or strategic bargaining problems which would
drive up the costs of a negotiated purchase. However, if every exercise of the power of
eminent domain were judged according to a judgmental entitlement-determination rule, the
transaction-cost savings would largely be eliminated by increased entitlement-determination
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No doubt there are other circumstances in which the determination of
property rights may have been influenced by entitlement-determination
costs. 17 But these examples are sufficiently numerous and diverse at least
to lend credibility to the model. It remains to inquire whether the forego-
ing analysis, which is basically positive or descriptive in nature, has any
normative implications.
V. SOME NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS
Even if the common law has taken transaction costs into account in
setting entitlement-determination rules, it has not done so perfectly. Only
an extreme determinist would assert that common-law rules evolve in
such a way that they always reflect the best of all possible worlds. The
dimensional test for differentiating between trespass and nuisance is a
case in point." 18 Although the test does fairly well in singling out a class of
low-transaction-cost disputes for mechanical rules, it is underinclusive.
There are clearly many nuisance disputes that must be characterized as
involving low transaction costs, and yet they are handled by an extremely
judgmental standard that tends to frustrate negotiated solutions.
One possible way to improve on the underinclusiveness of the dimen-
sional test would be to generate two sets of nuisance rules-one for
relatively high-transaction-cost situations, another for relatively low-
transaction-cost situations. Such a bifurcation could perhaps be achieved
via the ancient distinction between public and private nuisance. As inter-
preted today, these categories overlap to a considerable extent and are
subject to doctrine that is frequently indistinguishable. Older cases, how-
ever, insist that a private nuisance is one that affects only a few parties,
while a public nuisance affects the public at large. 119 Given that the small
costs. Thus, a rule like the one announced in Loretto is necessary in order to complete the
economizing function of the law of eminent domain.
17 One obvious parallel is found in the law of antitrust, with its distinction between per se
rules and rules of reason. Both courts and commentators have recognized that per se rules
entail lower implementation costs than rules of reason. See Arizona v. Maricopa County
Medical Society, 457 U.S. 332, 350-51 (1982); Frank H. Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies
and Counter Strategies, 48 U. Chi. L. Rev. 263, 333-37 (1981). One virtue of per se rules,
therefore, is that they should assist in business planning by giving fairly clear signals as to
what kind of behavior is and is not permissible. Other potentially fruitful areas of application
include contract and commercial law, see note 38, and the law of intellectual property, see
Edmund Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J. Law & Econ. 265
(1977).
1.8 The complex law relating to promises running with the land is another area where
streamlining could undoubtedly produce efficiencies. See text at notes 105-08 supra.
119 See, for example, The King v. Lloyd (1802) 4 Esp. 200, 170 Eng. Rep. 691; People v.
Rubenfeld, 254 N.Y. 245, 172 N.E. 485 (1930); Ballenger v. City of Grand Saline, 276
S.W.2d 874 (Tex. App. 1955).
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numbers/large numbers distinction is often a good proxy for high and low
transaction costs, this suggests, in turn, that the public/private-nuisance
distinction could be used to achieve a bifurcation in nuisance law. To
complete the transformation, private nuisance would have to be recast in
more mechanical terms-perhaps by adopting something like the substan-
tial physical invasion test that constitutes the cornerstone of Richard
Epstein's restatement of English nuisance law.' 2° Public nuisance could
then be governed by the cost-benefit formula of the American Restate-
ment, coupled (if one desires) with a relaxation of the standing require-
ments that have traditionally served as an impediment to public nuisance
suits by individuals.'
2'
The net result would be three different standards governing intrusions
to property-trespass, private nuisance, and public nuisance-ranging
from the highly mechanical rule of trespass at one end of the spectrum to
the highly judgmental rule of public nuisance at the other, with private
nuisance falling somewhere in between. 22 These standards would also
correspond to a rough continuum in terms of transaction costs, with tres-
pass applying to visible invasions generally having low transaction costs;
private nuisance to invisible invasions involving small numbers of parties,
but which because of possible difficulties of identification and enforce-
ment probably would entail somewhat higher transaction costs; and
public nuisance to widespread environmental harms, where negotiated
solutions are truly improbable.
More generally, the transaction-cost/entitlement-determination-cost
model provides an important justification for mechanical legal rules,
which have been in vague disrepute for some time. Part of the legacy of
the legal realist movement is that legal rules are viewed as "policy tools,"
and legal scholars demand that every rule have some "policy
justification."' 23 Mechanical rules tend to fare rather badly in such an
environment, particularly when viewed solely as decisional rules for use
in litigation, rather than as rules designed to avoid recourse to litigation.
The reason should not be hard to see. Mechanical rules-such as the
120 Epstein, supra note 20.
12 1 The Restatement has already taken a step in this direction. See Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 821C(2)(c) (1979).
122 Private nuisance would be more judgmental than trespass because there is ajudgmen-
tal element involved in deciding what constitutes a "substantial" invasion. Also, insofar as
defenses like the "live and let live" rule and the "locality" rule were recognized, see
Epstein, supra note 20, at 82-90, this would further increase the judgmental nature of
private nuisance.
123 See Hans A. Linde, Judges, Critics, and the Realist Tradition, 82 Yale L. J. 227, 228-
29 (1972).
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dimensional test for determining the boundary between trespass and nui-
sance-are crude and inflexible and often seem to produce unfair (or
inefficient) results in particular cases. 124 This leads commentators to ques-
tion the desirability of such rules and to urge other rules-typically mul-
tifactorial balancing tests-in their place. Such "reform," however, may
only make negotiated solutions to resource use disputes harder to reach,
thus undermining the general efficiency of the economic system.
Related to this is a point about the distributional consequences of me-
chanical and judgmental rules. Generally speaking, laymen tend to prefer
mechanical rules, even if they seem silly or inefficient, whereas spokes-
men for the legal community-including leading academics and judges-
tend to prefer judgmental rules. 125 This is as one would predict, assuming
that laymen prefer private solutions to resource disputes that minimize
the demand for lawyers and litigation, whereas the legal community pre-
fers collective solutions that increase the demand. Thus, if one believes
that we have too many lawyers or too much litigation, not only should one
ask that legislatures exercise restraint in replacing common-law rules with
regulatory schemes; one should also demand that courts exercise restraint
in replacing mechanical entitlement-determination rules with judgmental
entitlement-determination rules.
On the other side of the ledger, judgmental rules have also recently
come under criticism from legal scholars. For example, two of the areas
touched upon in this paper-nuisance and takings law-are notorious for
their doctrinal confusion and "ad hocery." Academics with a more
theoretical bent-those whom Bruce Ackerman calls "scientific policy-
makers" 126-have been understandably frustrated by this state of affairs,
and have sought to create new conceptual systems from first principles to
'24 Consider, for example, the comments of the Kentucky Court of Appeals when faced
with a sympathetic defendant in a building encroachment case: "[Wihat real and reasonable
difference stands between a nuisance and a continuing trespass? One is simply more visible
and tangible than the other. But the tangibility or technical classification of the civil wrong
has little to do with the gravity of its effect, and it cannot be the basis of any rational
distinction in equity." Bartman v. Shobe, 353 S.W.2d 550, 555 (Ky. 1962). For similar
argument from academic commentators, see W. Page Keeton & Clarence Morris, Notes on
"Balancing the Equities," 18 Tex. L. Rev. 412 (1940).
125 Compare Grant Gilmore, The Ages of American Law 17 (1977): "Within the legal
profession most practicing lawyers (who are interested in winning cases or in advising their
clients in such a way that they don't have cases) prefer a formalistic approach to law. That
approach holds the promise of stability, certainty, and predictibility-qualities which prac-
titioners value highly. Judges, on the other hand, are paid to decide cases. Apart from such
practices as bribery and corruption (which at times become institutionalized), judges want to
decide cases which come before them sensibly, wisely, even justly."
126 Bruce A. Ackerman, Private Property and the Constitution 15 (1977).
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reform these areas of the law. 127 Yet these efforts, however interesting
and commendable, have to a certain extent missed the point: doctrinal
confusion, question-begging Latin phrases, and unpredictable balancing
tests may be functional. That is, what the system builder perceives as
unprincipled decision making may in fact function as a relatively inexpen-
sive judgmental entitlement-determination rule. Why relatively inexpen-
sive? Because doctrinal indeterminacy affords a judge the discretion to
manipulate legal rules to achieve the result he intuits to be most fair (or
efficient), without having to articulate all the factors that go into the
development of that conclusion. In contrast, an internally coherent sys-
tem created from first principles-cost-benefit analysis immediately
comes to mind-may permit an equally wide range of results but will
likely require a time-consuming (and thus expensive) examination and
articulation of the factors that go into the formulation of the result.
I do not want to be understood to be saying that unprincipled decision
making is a good thing. 28 My point is simply that the persistence of
unprincipled decision making should not come as a surprise. Principled
decision making, like other social goods, is costly, and the more resources
devoted to any one particular good, the less will be left for other ends that
a rational society may desire to pursue.
127 In the area of nuisance law, see Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 27; Epstein, supra
note 20; Rabin, supra note 20. In the area of takings law, see Lawrence Berger, A Policy
Analysis of the Taking Problem, 49 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 165 (1974); Joseph Sax, Takings, Private
Property and Public Rights, 81 Yale L. J. 149 (1971); Michelman, supra note 112.
128 Compare Richard A. Posner, The Meaning of Judicial Self-Restraint (1983) (unpub-
lished manuscript) (a judge should always strive to be principled, in the sense of articulating
the true grounds for the decision).
